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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/03/2007

Accident number: 441

Accident time: 11:00

Accident Date: 08/10/2003

Where it occurred: Talailmannar Pier
East, Mannar District

Country: Sri Lanka

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: SF, MF, CH:
MAN/03/002

Date of main report: 11/10/2003
Name of source: Private

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast

Ground condition: building rubble
electromagnetic
hard
metal fragments
metal scrap
residential/urban
rocks/stones
soft

Date record created: 17/03/2007

Date last modified: 17/03/2007

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: WGS 84

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 79°43'50.70 E

Map north: 09°06'22.70 N

Map scale: TALAIMANNAR

Map series: ABMP

Map edition: 1

Map sheet: 11

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
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Accident report
Two versions of an internal investigation were made available in 2006. The first is a
preliminary report and the second is a more complete final report. Both are reproduced below,
edited for anonymity.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT
Part 1 – Description of the Incident
[A picture of the accident site – inside a rubble-strewn building – is shown below. The mine
crater is alongside the fallen visor.]

Narrative: During the removal of rubble, sand and rubbish in a holding area inside a building
(area has been cleared with metal detector and excavation drills in April 2003 by [the same
demining group]), the deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall to fill his
shovel again, as an uncontrolled detonation occurred. The detonation caused the traumatic
amputation of his left foot.
The area is located in front of a doorway inside a building, which was used since April 2003
as holding area for rubble, sand, rocks and vegetation. The area had been cleared in April
2003 under the supervision of [Name removed].
The crater was around 12 cm deep and 30 cm wide some parts of plastic body of the mine
were found inside and around the crater. Due to the nature of the ground inside the building –
sand mixed with rubble – it was quite difficult to determine the exact depth and diameter of
the crater.
[Parts of the mine are shown below.]

The weather was clear and hot. There was no vegetation. The ground was mixed, “As the
ground is a mix of sand and rubble, consequently it can be classified from soft to hard.”
The last external QA was on 23rd September by DMAO Vavuniya personnel.
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The Victim had completed his basic deminer course in November 2002.
The team had been working at the site for eight months, working 149 days.
On the day of the accident they had been working for 3 hours and 45 minutes.
The Victim was wearing PPE and visor, and there was “no damage on PPE/Visor resulting to
the blast or projection of plastic parts of the mine body”.
[The Victim’s left shoe is shown below.]

It took four minutes for medics to start treatment which went on for 15 minutes before the
Victim was taken to hospital in a journey that took 21 minutes. The ambulance arrived 11:40
AM in the Mannar Govt hospital and the treatment was terminated by 14:00 PM.

Internal Investigation Report: MAN/03/002
Introduction
This accident report has been written in accordance with the terms of reference supplied by
Mrs. [Name removed] [Technical Advisor] District Mine Action Office Vavuniya assigned by
[Name removed] [Senior Advisor & Secretary National Steering Committee on Mine Action].
A copy of the terms of reference is attached as Annex a.
1.

Following persons investigated the circumstances surrounding the mine incident:

[Names removed]
2.

When, where, how and why the accident occurred

The accident occurred Wednesday 08th October 2003 at approximately 11:00 am on the
demining site in Thalaimannar Pier (Mannar District of Northern Province of Sri Lanka;
Long/Lat E79° 43’ 50.70” / N09° 06’ 22.70”). There were several witnesses while the accident
occurred, such as the supervisor, team leader, section leader and one deminer.
Progression of accident
During the removal of spoil (rubble, sand, metal pieces, rubbish) out of the holding area inside
a building (area has been cleared with metal detector and excavation drills in April 2003), the
deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall to fill his shovel again, as an
uncontrolled detonation occurred. The detonation caused the traumatic amputation of his left
foot.
The minefield in general
The minefield is situated between the Navy base (3m high wall) and the main road in
Talaimannar Pier. The minefield contains a number of abandoned buildings, is clearly fenced
off and has been used over the past years as a rubbish dump. Its purpose was to protect the
Navy base against an attack from east and has a clear pattern. On the beach side the mines
were laid in a 4-row mine belt. The remaining part of the minefield contains more than 20
abandoned buildings where the mines were in front of doorways, below windows and on the
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backside (east side) of the buildings. As such the team working in Talaimannar was well
aware of the critical spots of this minefield. By the end of September the team had cleared
over 12,000 m2 and 1,165 AP mines.
The accident site
In April 2003 the team still carried out technical survey. The main objective was to obtain the
required access throughout the entire minefield. Since the area was restricted by heavy
vegetation, there was a need for temporary holding areas. The supervisor in charge decided
the building (shop) would be an appropriate site for rubble, sand, metal pieces and
vegetation. Consequently the inside of the building has been entirely cleared with metal
detector and excavation drills in April 2003 and 3 mines (Chinese Type 72 A) were found. The
supervisor decided to tape off the short corridor adjacent to the shop – to be cleared later.
Nevertheless, the supervisor, the team leader and deminer visually inspected the corridor
from the doorway, as such standing on the spot, where the accident happened. During the
period April to October the site has been used intensively as holding area – left side for
vegetation and right side for rubble, sand and metal pieces – consequently the ground has
been walked over countless times.
Observations
Following observations are clear evidence that [Demining Group]’s worksite (minefield
Talaimannar Pier east) has undergone a certain level of intrusion, because:
1. the local population did not consistently stop throwing rubbish into the area after
[Demining Group] started the clearance operations;
2. evidence of disturbance / destruction of the permanent fence around the minefield;
3. recently, in 2 cases where we cleared access to abandoned buildings, the team and
section leaders checked the inside of the building and as well visually through the
windows and all doors if there is any evidence of mines. They did not find anything. A
couple of days later as they did the planning for the clearance around these buildings,
they found 2 AP mines (Chinese Type 72 A) laying close to a doorstep and outside in
front of a window. It was very obvious these mines were placed and/or thrown there,
as they would have been visible before.
4. in one of these two buildings we found evidence that local were using the building as
access to collect coconuts during our absence.
The incidents were reported to the respective authorities and the locals were asked not to
enter the area unless [Demining Group] has completed the clearance. Mine Risk Education
(MRE) is an ongoing process executed by the local NGO called CTF.

Conclusions / possible options
By taking into consideration all facts and talk over various scenarios the internal investigation
team came to the following options regarding the mine in previous cleared ground, which then
caused the uncontrolled detonation.
Option 1)
2003

[Demining Group] missed the mine during the previous clearance in April

The entire building has been cleared by detector and where necessary by excavation drills.
Especially the area close to the doorstep – where the uncontrolled detonation happened –
was cleared purely by excavation due to the high metal contamination, the close presence of
the reinforced concrete wall and red bricks in the corner, which eliminated the proper use of
the metal detector. The inside of the building has been used as holding area and has been
walked over countless times. The spoil carried into the building was the result of excavation in
areas near by; consequently it is impossible to miss an item of the size 7.8 x 3.8 cm in green
colour.
=> Therefore Option 1 unlikely
Option 2)
While clearing the corridor the mine was dislodged and rolled down into the
area where the accident happened
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Very unlikely since the 4 mines found in the corridor were buried and additionally covered
(approx. 30 – 40 cm) by rubble. If the mine rolled down, the deminer who assisted (the
casualty) to clean the rubble, would have seen the mine laying on the surface because his
position / view was directed all the time towards the rear wall / doorstep.
Note: A comparison blowing up of a AP mine type 72 A buried 5 cm inside the building
(carried out 14.10.) resulted to the same extend of crater, consequently the investigation team
concludes the mine had to be buried.
=> Therefore Option 2 unlikely
Option 3)

Someone discarded the mine after we had cleared the area

Option 4)

Someone purposely planted the mine after we had cleared the area

Particular observations (described above) indicate the direction of options 3 and 4.
Nevertheless, the investigation team is not able to give a clear statement whether option 3 or
4 is more likely the truth.
=> Therefore Option 3 or 4 in all probability
Recommendations
(1) The investigation team considers the time factor – start of task till handing over – as one of
the critical issues regarding the clearance site Talaimannar Pier east. On the one hand
[Demining Group] should have pushed handing over the cleared area part by part as a
ongoing process, consequently to limit the risk to be liable by resettle people as soon as
possible. On the other hand and for the future [Demining Group] must take this factor into
consideration when planning clearance tasks – divide large areas into sub-areas.
(2) The local authorities have to be increasingly involved in the security and appropriate policy
of such minefields. In addition all players in mine clearance and UNDP Mine Action need to
discuss and propose adequate solutions regarding “secure access to minefields”. [Demining
Group] will take immediate action to reinforce the fencing and set-up a single entry/exit of the
remaining part of the Talaimannar Pier east minefield.
(3) The entire inside of the building (shop) must be re-excavated. All sensitive areas
(backside of the buildings, doorways and outside windows) in the southern part of the
minefield, which will be handed over soon, have to be re-checked. In addition all holding
areas have to be re-checked.
Note: The team completed these tasks 17th October and no mines or UXO were found.
(4) The investigation team considers the process of reinforced / complete Mine Risk
Education (MRE) as indispensable.
The cause, nature and extent of injuries caused as a result of the accident
The deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall (his left foot must have had a
distance of approx. 30cm from the wall/doorway) to fill his shovel again, as he must have
stepped on the AP mine (Chinese Type 72 A) and an uncontrolled detonation occurred. The
detonation caused the traumatic amputation of his left foot.
The cause, nature and extent of damage to any property
There was no damage caused to any [Demining Group] equipment or private property.
The level of training and experience of the people involved in the accident
Both deminers, the casualty and the deminer clearing the site in April 2003, had successfully
completed the [Demining Group] basic deminer course in November 2003. Consequently both
had at that time 4 respectively 9 months operational experience in the field what is considered
to be a good level of experience particularly after being deployed most of their time in a
minefield like Talaimannar Pier east. Both deminers cleared up to date more than hundred AP
mines.
The daily work schedule of the organisation and the specific work schedule of the day
of the accident
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Work schedule according to [Demining Group] SOP (part 5, para 5.11.2 and 5.12): Deminers
are not to work for more than 50 minutes and a 10-minute break.
Specific work schedule: As it gets very hot in the afternoon, the team starts as soon as there
is full daylight. In general each shift is maximum 45 minutes followed by a 15-minute break. At
08:00 am the team has a 30-minute breakfast break and between 12:15 pm and 01:00 pm a
45-minute lunch break. The last shift finished at 01:45 pm consequently the cumulative
productive operational time was 5 hrs 15 minutes. Following the last shift, the demolition of
cleared mines and the cleaning of all equipment take place. Approx. 03:00 pm the team
heads back to the field base in Pesalai.
The extend of leave and rest periods for deminers preceding the accident
The deminers have every month a long weekend (3 days) and over Christmas/ New Year
[Demining Group] shuts down operations for 2 weeks.
Dates of last internal QA and results of that QA
Internal QA is an ongoing process executed by supervisor, team leader and section leader.
Areas cleared by metal detector will be partly re-checked. However, the areas cleared by full
excavation will not be re-excavated but the drills are continuously supervised.
Dates of last external QA and results of that QA
External QA has been carried out 3rd and 23rd of September. The results were positive and
no complaints reported.
The suitability of PPE worn by deminers and the demining equipment being employed on
the site. Determine the extend to which the use of PPE assisted in the reduction on injuries to
the deminer
The deminer was wearing his personal protective equipment – vest and visor. This protective
equipment will not prevent or reduce the injury of such an accident.
Dates of last refresher training for the team and if the team involved in the accident
attended that training
The last refresher training was carried out by the end of June 2003 (after the occurrence of
[Demining Group]’s first accident in Talaimannar Pier east) on the following issues:
Action “on signal reading and investigation“ including immediate reporting to supervision staff
in case of any problems or difficulties occur; “full excavation drill and using detector in areas
heavily contaminated by metal”
Note: The action on “full excavation drill and using detector in areas heavily contaminated by
metal” was re-trained by re-clearing the entire beach area where the first accident happened.
The level of medical support and evacuation available on that day of the accident and the
extend of training and preparation prior to the accident
One (1) ambulance and 2 trained medics with fully equipped trauma kit were available on site.
The medics and ambulance reached the deminer within approximately 4 minutes of the
detonation. He was immediately given first aid and evacuated to Mannar Base Hospital, in
accordance with the casualty evacuation drill. The medic acted professionally, quickly and in
accordance with his training.
Determine whether the injury was contributed to or caused by:
1. An error in SOP of the organisation
The accident was neither contributed to nor caused by an error in the SOP.
2. An error in application of SOP by the deminer involved
As the deminer was cleaning in a previously cleared area no error or breach of the SOP
occurred from the side of the deminer.
3. A failure or weakness in the command and control structure imposed by the agency
No obvious failure in the command and control structure imposed by [Demining Group].
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4. Environmental conditions – terrain, vegetation, weather
No, the weather was good at the accident time no strong wind or unusual temperature was
reported.
5. Any other cause
Most likely a disposed, relocated or re-laid through a third party.

The report is to make conclusions on the following:
a)
The key factors contributing to the accident; this may include any shortfalls in training,
procedures, equipment or management
No specific key factors contributing to the accident.
See Para 2a) for observations, conclusions and recommendations

The report is to make recommendations on:
a)

Modifications of training or procedures

No modifications of training or procedures are required.
b)

Modifications to equipment

No modifications to equipment are required.
c)
site

Corrective action required for management (command and control) of the minefield

It is recommended to secure access for third parties into the minefield. {Demining Group] will
immediately reinforce the fencing of the remaining un-cleared area. Planning and clearance of
large tasks must consider the partitioning as a key factor.
For more details, see Para 2a) for observations, conclusions and recommendations
d)
Any other immediate or longer-term action that should be taken to prevent such
accidents occurring in the future.
No. See Para 2) for observations, conclusions and recommendations

Signed: [Demining Group] Programme Manager and Senior Technical Advisor
[Scanned versions of witness statements are held on file.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 588

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 24

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
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COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical Report
The following is the content of a Medical report from “Base Hospital, Mannar”, dated 14th
October 2003, summarised for anonymity.
The victim was admitted at 11:40 on 8th October 2003. The below knee (left) amputation is
done. I am of the opinion that he needs about three months bed rest and physiotherapy.
Signed: District Medical Officer
In 2006, it was reported that the Victim had been re-deployed by the Demining Group but had
subsequently left their employment.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because the mine was either
placed after clearance or missed during clearance some months before, so the Victim was not
searching in the area. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because
the investigators recognised that the delay in completing this section of the site may have
contributed to the accident by "inviting" the public to place devices in the ruined building, so
recommended changes to site management.
Despite the fact that the accident reports are “internal”, they appear to have been carried out
with a view to determining and reporting the real causes, which is unusual enough to be
worthy of note.
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